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MEXICO: ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND
THE STATE OIL COMPANY
Gary B. Conine*
I. INTRODUCTION
The state oil company is a common participant in today's interna-
tional petroleum industry. These companies were non-existent in the
early decades of the century. But as host governments became more in-
terested in greater control and participation in the development of their
countries' petroleum resources, state enterprises became popular instru-
ments of public policy.
These enterprises have been used in several ways. Countries such as
Norway will grant a petroleum license only to a consortium that includes
its state oil company as a participant. In most countries, such as Indone-
sia, the state oil company has the exclusive right to government conces-
sions for the exploration and development of petroleum, but the
company is free to contract with foreign investors for the financing and
management of the concession through production sharing agreements
or risk-service contracts. In a few countries, the state oil company is the
only entity entitled to petroleum concessions and is precluded from in-
volving other investors in its exploration and development activities. The
company may even be granted a virtual monopoly over all phases of the
petroleum industry. Mexico provides one of the best examples of the
latter practice. Since the government's 1938 expropriation of private oil
companies, Petr6leos Mexicanos, or PEMEX, has been the sole partici-
pant in Mexico's petroleum industry.
State oil companies gained much of their popularity in the 1970s.
While world oil prices were climbing, these enterprises were extremely
successful. When profits were sufficient to obscure the inefficiencies and
other difficulties inherent in the operation of a government monopoly,
* J.D., 1977, University of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1988, Harvard Law School. Associate Profes-
sor, University of Houston Law Center. Former partner, Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & LaBoon,
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potential problems were not apparent. But as oil prices collapsed in the
last decade, state companies have experienced trouble in maintaining
profit levels and in obtaining outside investment. As a result, they have
been unable to maintain their reserve base and have often been criticized
for overproduction in an effort to sustain earnings.
As one of the largest state oil companies, PEMEX offers an excel-
lent case study on the problems currently faced by such enterprises, the
options for overcoming these problems, and the direction the oil industry
may take in developing countries during the next few years. Possible
changes in the structure and operation of PEMEX are important for an-
other reason. Its monopoly position precludes active participation by
U.S. companies in a neighboring country with significant energy markets
and resources. As Mexico seeks closer trading ties with the United
States, the U.S. oil industry is asking that Mexico take steps to open its
borders to more foreign participation. The extent to which Mexico can
and is willing to alter its petroleum industry may have a crucial effect on
the success of the North American Trade talks.
This article examines the origin and structure of PEMEX, the pres-
ent condition of Mexico's petroleum industry, and the measures the gov-
ernment and PEMEX are adopting and are likely to adopt in the near
future in an effort to overcome current deficiencies in the industry. The
success or failure of revitalizing the petroleum industry in Mexico may
determine the economic future of Mexico and the direction other devel-
oping countries take in handling similar problems.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE MEXICAN OIL INDUSTRY
A. Early Mexican Petroleum Laws
Except for a brief period at the turn of the century, Mexico has
followed the general practice of vesting petroleum rights in the state. It
departs from the practice of most countries by restricting the grant of
concessions to these rights to PEMEX. Together, these factors form the
basis for the company's monopoly over virtually all aspects of Mexico's
petroleum industry. Their origin is grounded in both history and poli-
tics, creating a situation in which sovereignty over petroleum resources
and the role of PEMEX is a matter of national heritage celebrated yearly
in a de facto national holiday.
Mexico's earliest mining laws were inherited under Spanish rule and
[Vol. 27:625
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followed civil law tradition by placing mineral ownership in the sover-
eign.1 After Mexico attained independence from Spain, the country's
political history was dominated by the regime of Porfirio Diaz, which
was intent on attracting foreign investment and stimulating private enter-
prise. During a brief interlude in this regime, the Diaz policies continued
to influence the government, and Mexico enacted the Mining Law of
1884.2 The new law made oil and gas the subject of private ownership.3
Following the first major discovery of commercial reserves in 1901,
large areas of Mexico were acquired by foreign interests for petroleum
development. 4 By 1917, the country was the world's second largest pro-
ducer of crude oil with 440 private companies producing 55 million bar-
rels annually.5 As usual, petroleum operations were largely controlled
by the major oil companies. In the mid-1930s, Royal Dutch/Shell, Stan-
dard Oil of New Jersey, Sinclair, Cities Service, and Gulf Oil were pro-
ducing ninety-five percent of Mexico's crude oil.6
B. Revolution and Expropriation
The oil companies fully expected that the latest mineral legislation
would assure their absolute ownership to petroleum rights on private
lands.7 But the economic policies of the Diaz regime that formed the
basis for these laws were in conflict with the revolutionary movement
that had given Mexico its independence. The movement's resentment of
1. Spanish law placed gold, silver, and quicksilver mines under the ownership of the Crown as
early as 1387. The first mining laws designed specifically for Mexico under Spanish reign were the
Ordenanzas de Aranjuez decreed in 1783 by Carlos III. In 1865, Mexico's first mining law after
independence continued to prohibit salt, coal, and oil development without a government conces-
sion. Las Reales Ordenanzas para la Mineria de la Nueva Espaiia, art. 1 (1865) [Royal Orders for
the Mining of New Spain]. The country's first oil company was Compafiia Explotadora del Petr6leo
del Golfa de M6xico founded by American investors in 1870.
2. C6digo de Mineria de 22 de noviembre de 1884, tit. 1, art. 10, Diario Oficial Nov. 26, 1884.
3. This right was reinforced by the Mining Law of 1892, which made private ownership of
minerals "irrevocable and perpetual." Ley Minera de 4 de junio de 1892, tit. 1, arts. 4, 5, in LEY
MINERA Y LEY DE IMPUESTO A LA MINERiA CON SUs REsPECTIVoS REGLAMENTOS [Mining Stat-
ute and Mining Activities Taxation Statute with Corresponding Regulations] 3, 4-5 (1892). While
petroleum operations on federal lands were still owned by the state, liberal concessions were rou-
tinely granted by the government. FREDDA J. BULLARD, MExico's NATURAL GAS: THE BEGIN-
NING OF AN INDUSTRY 2-3 (1968).
4. WENDELL C. GORDON, THE EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY IN MEX-
ICo 5 (1941).
5. ABDERRAHMANE MEGATELI, PETROLEUM, POLITICS AND NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 36
(1978) (unpublished thesis, University of Texas (Austin)).
6. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE 272 (1990).
7. For a thorough analysis of the companies' perspective, see Ernest E. Smith & John S.
Dzienkowski, A Fifty Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 13, 24-
26 (1989).
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foreign domination and economic oppression triggered the 1910 Revolu-
tion that ended the Diaz regime and led to the creation of a new Consti-
tution in 1917 that again reversed the Mexican position on mineral
ownership.' The crucial provision for the oil companies was Article 27
which reserved certain minerals, including petroleum, to the state. 9
To enforce the dictates of the Constitution, the Petroleum Law of
1925 required that government concessions be obtained to confirm rights
on the basis of which oil was being produced prior to May 1, 1917.10
Although a majority of the companies complied, I I those holding most of
8. The nationalistic attitude toward the petroleum industry that was so apparent in the 1910
Revolution persists today. Private ownership of petroleum resources is still forbidden under the
Constitution in order to prevent national assets from being controlled by outside forces. The same
concern can be seen in policies that have emphasized conservation of natural resources or energy
self-sufficiency.
Until the mid-1970s, Mexico emphasized conservation of its petroleum reserves. The reserves
were regarded as a national treasure that should be used wisely to fuel domestic economic develop-
ment or preserved for use by future generations. Exportable surpluses were to be avoided to prevent
production from being obtained by foreign powers on terms that were exploitative of Mexico's inter-
ests. With the discovery of additional reserves in the mid-1970s this approach was modified to
permit exports to the extent the revenues could be absorbed by the domestic economy. See
Secretaria de Patrimonio y Fomento Industrial, Programa de Energih: Metas a 1 99 0 y Proyecciones
al aido 2000 [Secretary of Industrial Resources, Energy Program, 1990 Goals and Projections to the
year 2000], ENERG TICOS 4 (November 1980). This change was based on: (1) a lack of domestic
refining capacity to handle production of new reserves; (2) the oil industry's need for foreign ex-
change to finance its expansion; (3) a favorable international market and foreign pressure to export
crude oil; and (4) the opportunity to offset reduced growth in the manufacturing sector. The wis-
dom of this policy change was questioned when world oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, leaving
the country with sizeable foreign debts and reduced revenues. In the economic crisis precipitated by
the fall in oil prices, Mexico has reverted to earlier policies and has declined to rely on additional
production of crude oil at low prices to improve its economic condition.
Avoiding foreign influence also requires energy self-sufficiency so that imports are not relied
upon to meet internal demand. After a slow start caused by reorganization, labor problems, and a
war-related shortage of materials, PEMEX focused on expanding its reserves and distribution sys-
tems to meet national demand. The most recent national energy programs have sought to ensure
energy independence through diversification of available fuels. For example, considerable emphasis
is now placed on the expanded use of coal and nuclear energy due to availability and price. Until
recently, use of low-quality fuel oil was encouraged through subsidies in order to assure the availabil-
ity of light crude oil for the export market.
9. In part, Article 27 provided:
In the nation is vested legal ownership ... of all minerals or substances which in veins,
layers, masses or beds constitute deposits whose nature is different from the components of
the land .... [including] petroleum and all hydrocarbons-solid, liquid or gaseous.
Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, para. 4 (Mex. 1917, amended 1960)
[hereinafter Constitution].
10. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo de Petr6lo [Regulations for
Article 27 of the Constitution in the Area of Petroleum], reprinted in 15 LEGISLACI6N PETROLERA:
LEYES, DECRETOS Y DIsPosICIONEs ADMINISTRATIVAS REFERENTES A LA INDUSTRIA DEL PE-
TR6LEO [Petroleum Legislation: Statutes, Decrees and Administrative Orders Referring to the Pe-
troleum Industry] 51 (1925).
11. HARLOW S. PERSON, MEXICAN OIL 46 (1942).
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the producing properties resisted. 12 The resistors argued that such action
by the government was precluded by Article 14 of the Constitution
which prohibited retroactive laws that prejudiced personal rights. 3 But
neither the government nor the companies pressed their claims. Mexico
continued to depend on foreign investment while an increasing share of
the country's oil trade was being lost to cheaper Venezuela production.
14
The government asserted that compliance by a majority of the companies
established the success of the government action and an uneasy peace
prevailed over the ownership issue.
Expropriation of the oil companies was triggered by labor problems,
rather than title disputes. In 1935, the petroleum workers' union
presented a new labor contract for collective bargaining. Following a
year of unsuccessful negotiations, the union initiated a ten-day general
strike in May 1937. Under Mexico's Constitution, the dispute was sub-
mitted to the Federal Board of Mediation and Arbitration, which or-
dered a twenty-seven percent wage increase and the creation of pension
and medical plans, sick leave policies, and vacation pay. 15 The Mexican
Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision but the oil companies in-
formed the government on March 15, 1938, that they would not comply
with the order to execute the contract.1 6
A 1936 law 7 had authorized the nation's President to expropriate
property for purposes of public utility. Faced with potential economic
and political chaos resulting from the stalemate in the oil industry, Presi-
dent Crdenas issued an expropriation decree on March 18, 1938. The
action was politically popular. Though based on economic necessity, the
expropriation was a redeclaration of the nationalism that had driven the
revolution, a reaffirmation of the coalition of government and labor that
emerged from the revolution, and a reinstatement of the nation's uncon-
tested patrimony over its natural resources.
C. Creation of PEMEX
Three institutions vied for authority to assume control of petroleum
operations. The National Petroleum Administration had been created in
12. MERRILL RIPPY, OIL AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION 29 (1972).
13. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 7, at 28.
14. YERGIN, supra note 6, at 272.
15. ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS 160 (1985).
16. L.H. Woolsey, Editorial Comment, The Expropriation of Oil Properties by Mexico, 32 AM.
J. INT'L L. 519, 519-20 (1938).
17. Expropriation Law, art. 1, D.O. Nov. 23, 1936.
19921
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1925 to compete with private firms in producing and refining crude oil
and to regulate the price of petroleum in the domestic market.1 8 These
functions had been transferred in 1935 to Petromex, a quasi-autonomous
company half-owned by the government. The Cfirdenas administration
had also created the General Administration of National Petroleum in
1936 to oversee the development of the petroleum industry and the train-
ing of technical personnel. 19 The third contender was the petroleum
workers union, whose members had assumed operating control of oil
company facilities as foreign managers and technicians departed.20
President Cfirdenas rejected all three and instead created PEMEX
on June 7, 1938. As a result, PEMEX became the first state-owned oil
company formed to take over the assets expropriated from foreign own-
ers.z" By 1940, all other government agencies involved with the petro-
leum industry were abolished and their functions transferred to
PEMEX.22 PEMEX was established as a state monopoly with a broad
mandate over exploration, development, refining, transportation, storage,
distribution, and first sale of oil, natural gas, and their products.23 The
company is precluded from granting any interest in its concessions2 4 or
operations to other persons.25
PEMEX is organized as a decentralized public institution26 owned
jointly by the federal government and the petroleum workers union. The
concept of a decentralized agency was borrowed from French law. Such
bodies are characterized by a legal status separate from the government,
a patrimony of its own, a degree of independence from general regula-
tions, an ability to conduct commercial activities like a private enterprise
and, in theory, autonomy from government control.27
The company is managed by a Board of Directors comprised of
eleven members, six of whom are appointed by Mexico's President. The
remaining five members are designated by the petroleum workers union
18. Christopher C. Joyner, Petr61eos Mexicanos in a Developing Society: The Political Economy
of Mexico's National Oil Industry, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 63, 68 (1982).
19. Isidro Sepulveda, PEMEX in a Dependent Society, in U.S.-MEXICAN ENERGY RELATION-
SHIPS 46 (Jerry R. Ladman et al. eds., 1981).
20. GEORGE W. GRAYSON, THE POLMCS OF MEXICAN OIL 18-19 (1980).
21. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 7, at 30.
22. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27, supra note 10, art. 3.
23. Id.
24. Organic Act of Petr6leos Mexicanos, art. 7, 306 D.O. Jan. 1, 1971 [hereinafter Organic Act
of PEMEX].
25. Id. art. 16.
26. Id. art. 1.
27. Carlos R.V. Barrera, The International Sale of Natural Gas: The PEMEX-Border Gas, Inc.
Contract, 17 TEx. INT'L L.J. 15, 17 (1982).
[Vol. 27:625
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from among its active members working for PEMEX.28 By law, the
President of the Board is now the Secretary of Energy, Mines and Paras-
tatal Industries.2 9 Daily operations are overseen by a Director General
and seven subdirectors, also appointed by the nation's President. Sub-
directories, or divisions, exist for primary production, industrial produc-
tion (or refining), projects construction, petrochemicals, commercial
activity, finances, and technical and administrative operations. Several
subsidiaries have been created and more are expected as the company
attempts to streamline its operations. Presently, the most significant sub-
sidiary is PMI Comercio International, S.A. de C.V., which is responsi-
ble for international transactions, such as the export and import of oil,
gas, and petrochemicals.30
Despite its decentralized status, PEMEX is far from independent.
Its activities are closely monitored by other federal agencies. Besides the
obvious political influence asserted in the appointment of senior manage-
ment, the federal government maintains other control over PEMEX.
The company's annual investment plan and its budget are subject to the
approval of the Departments of the Presidency and the Treasury and
Public Credit. The annual operational plan must be approved by the
National Wealth Department. The annual financial statement is subject
to the approval of the Departments of Treasury and Public Credit and
National Wealth." As part of a general effort to better control decen-
tralized organizations, the Secretary of Energy, Mines and Parastatal In-
dustries is charged with coordinating, evaluating, and planning the
operations of the company.32
Moreover, PEMEX is affected by government policies that directly
28. Organic Act of PEMEX, supra note 24, art. 5.
29. The other government directors are the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, the Secre-
tary of Commerce and Industrial Development, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of
Programming and Budget, and the Director General of the Federal Electricity Commission.
30. Other subsidiaries include the Mexican Exploration Company and the state natural gas
distribution company.
31. Organic Act of PEMEX, supra note 24, art. 15.
32. Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, 339 D.O. Dec. 29, 1976 (amended
1978). The actions of those responsible for such organizations are, in turn, coordinated by the Secre-
tary of Planning and Budget. In addition, it should also be noted that the Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Promotion supervise prices and tariffs on petroleum goods
and services, Organic Law of Federal Public Administration, arts. 31 and 34; the Ministry of Com-
munications and Transportation supervises transportation of petroleum products, Organic Law of
the Federal Public Administration, art. 36; and the Department of Labor supervises relations be-
tween PEMEX and the Petroleum Workers Union, Organic Law of the Federal Public Administra-
tion, art. 40.
1992]
7
Conine: Mexico: Energy Development and the State Oil Company
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
apply to energy operations. During each six-year administration, guide-
lines are set for exploration and production based on political considera-
tions and economic priorities. Since the 1970s, each Presidential
administration has constructed and published its own National Energy
Plan that is consistent with its National Plan of Development under the
country's National System of Democratic Planning.33 Each energy plan
is designed by the Ministry of Planning and Budget in coordination with
the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Parastatal Industry, PEMEX, and the
Federal Commission of Electricity.34 Within these plans, socio-economic
policies seem to have an important impact on the company. The govern-
ment periodically has attempted to vary the impact of these factors on
energy policy. But these actions have been susceptible to reversal with
each change of administration. As a result, these factors tend to have a
continuing effect on energy policy and PEMEX.
III. ENERGY POLICIES AND PROBLEMS
In essence, PEMEX is a government authorized and regulated mo-
nopoly. Its monopoly status, however, is not justified by traditional eco-
nomic theory.35 With the possible exception of its pipeline operations,
none of the company's operations are of a scale that constitutes a natural
monopoly. Instead, each rationale for the exclusive activities of the com-
pany is political.
Several justifications for the creation of state enterprises have been
identified in economics literature.36 Of these, two seem predominant in
both the 1938 expropriation of foreign companies and the subsequent
creation and management of PEMEX. The first was the achievement of
national economic emancipation. Given the strategic importance of pe-
troleum to the country's developing economy, the traditional belief that
Mexico's petroleum resources were the nation's patrimony, the historical
distaste for foreign domination, and the obstinance of foreign oil compa-
nies in refusing to relinquish portions of the economic rents obtained
33. Constitution, supra note 9, art. 27, para. 4; Ley de Planeaci6n, art. 12, D.O. Jan. 5, 1983.
34. Ley de Planeaci6n, supra note 33, arts. 16, 17, 21-24; Organic Law of the Federal Public
Administration, supra note 32, arts. 32, 33.
35. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-20 (1982).
36. Among these are (1) correction of market failures, such as the elimination of uncompetitive
market structures and correction of economic externalities, and (2) political aims, such as national
economic emancipation, reduction of dependence on private enterprise decisions, a desire to achieve
benefits from vertical integration, and pursuit of socio-political goals. MARIAN RADETZKI, STATE
MINERAL ENTERPRISES 9-13 (1985).
[Vol. 27:625
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through their operations in labor concessions, the reaction of the Mexi-
can government in both the 1917 Constitution and the 1938 expropria-
tion is not surprising. The history of the Mexican oil industry between
these episodes is one of continued efforts by Mexico to re-establish con-
trol over petroleum as a national resource.
The second motivation for creation of this state enterprise was the
advancement of socio-economic goals through the activities and revenues
derived from the company. Such functions not only have been assigned
to the company by law, but also are inherently a part of the company's
ownership and management structure. The public service orientation
and the close connection with the government creates a unique atmos-
phere for any national oil company. Several characteristics inherent in
this setting assist in understanding the internal processes and policy con-
straints placed on such companies. 37 As quasi-public institutions, the
companies have public obligations beyond the profit orientation of most
private firms, including concerns over externalities, national employ-
ment, income distribution, and regional equity." Few of these issues can
avoid political debate. Further complicating PEMEX administration is
the political relationship between management and government officials,
which assures that all decisions are politically oriented. Consequently,
these public objectives not only determine the direction of the company
but also may represent conflicting public needs and political demands
that make consensus and rational coordination of operations difficult.
Despite the political justification for the creation of PEMEX, it is
still subject to the same concerns and weaknesses that affect any regu-
lated industry that is granted monopoly power. Three matters are of
particular importance. First, having authorized monopoly power within
a market area, the government must protect the consuming public
against abuse by assuring adequate service at reasonable prices. To a
great extent, both are achieved through the rates that the company is
permitted to charge the consumer. The monopoly should not be allowed
to use its market power to charge prices in excess of those that would be
imposed in a competitive setting. Yet the company must be allowed to
set prices at a level that will assure it a rate of return after taxes that will
37. For a more detailed discussion of these characteristics, see id. at 38-39.
38. For example, PEMEX objectives were once listed as contribution to the formation of the
nation's capital, integration with the overall economy, assistance with regional and social develop-
ment, stimulation of domestic enterprise, increase of oil reserves, establishment of petrochemical
production, and efficiency. MEGATELI, supra note 5, at 78-79.
1992]
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encourage additional investment so that goods and services can be pro-
vided at adequate levels. Second, the government must be alert to the
inefficiencies inherent in a business whose market is assured and whose
prices can be fixed to cover whatever costs are incurred. Unless con-
trolled, prices will be higher than necessary or service will be less than
adequate. Third, the government must assure that the monopoly's posi-
tion is not used to discriminate against potential customers or to prevent
legally competing goods and services from getting to the marketplace.
Unfortunately, these concerns have not been given the attention deserved
by the Mexican government. As a consequence, PEMEX has not been
encouraged or permitted to provide the service needed by the nation.
Low prices, government taxes, inefficient operations, and expensive social
obligations have left the company short on after-tax profits and have re-
stricted its ability to attract outside funding. Reinvestment in PEMEX
and capital expenditures on such activities as exploration have suffered.
This has periodically resulted in declining reserves and, when investment
is made in exploration to expand reserves, a failure to invest in the infra-
structure needed to ensure efficient use of production.39
On the matter of prices, government policies have failed to assure
PEMEX remains a viable enterprise. The long-standing use of price sub-
sidies to provide petroleum products at low prices to stimulate economic
development has deprived the company of much of the revenues it could
have used over the years for energy development. While the most recent
trend has been toward elimination of these subsidies, some remain in the
form of inflation controls. Moreover, PEMEX has been used as a princi-
pal source of government revenues without a compensating adjustment
in prices and permitted income. The resulting financial drain on
PEMEX as a result of taxes has been criticized for years. Taxes have
recently been reduced but remain significant.4' For example, as a result
of taxes paid in 1989, only $7 million of the company's pre-tax profit of
$7.9 billion remained in the company. In 1990, PEMEX paid $12 bil-
lion, over half its income, in federal taxes.41
39. For example, the failure to construct pipelines to market associated gas resulted in extensive
and wasteful flaring in the 1970s.
40. PEMEX is subject to a 50% tax on crude oil exports, 27% on production income and
royalty taxes of from 10 to 35%.
41. George W. Grayson, Mexico's PEMEXBegins to Act Like a Competitor, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 1991, at All.
[Vol. 27:625
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At the same time, the company's bureaucratic nature and its mo-
nopoly position have been allowed to instill it with inefficiencies that fur-
ther reduce its profits and limit its effectiveness as an enterprise. In the
absence of competition and with little reason to be concerned with profits
for its government owner, the company has lacked adequate incentive to
promote efficiency. Within the company's massive structure and polit-
ical maneuvering, accountability has been minimized and decisions
centralized so that effective management is lacking. Even upper manage-
ment can take shelter in the ability and duty of the government to cover
losses and failures during the"short term of the administration that ap-
pointed them.
Additionally, PEMEX has been assigned a social as well as a busi-
ness function. In general, the company is expected to promote the eco-
nomic development of the country. But the company also has been
required to participate directly in the economic development of those re-
gions where it operates. PEMEX promotes, coordinates, finances, and
executes economic development projects designed to compensate for the
effects of petroleum operations. But its obligations go far beyond the
social responsibilities normally placed on corporate enterprises. Health,
education, housing, recreation, and retirement programs are standard
projects for the company. During 1990, twenty projects in nine states
cost 88 trillion pesos. It is not uncommon for social purposes to become
justifications for policies pursued by government regulated monopolies.
However, such projects add to the cost of the company's central opera-
tions and distract its talent and attention from its principal goal.
As the sole entity authorized to develop, refine, transport, and mar-
ket Mexico's petroleum resources, its central purpose is clearly to finance
and manage the nation's petroleum industry. The difficulty for PEMEX
is that this central purpose is not always consistent with the social and
political objectives of the government. From a business perspective, the
company must ensure that revenues exceed expenses and that there is a
source of continuing investment to replenish the wasting assets of the
company. But as a state-owned monopoly, it is expected to be responsive
to public needs and to accept political decisions that affect its finances
and operations with less objection than the private sector. Factors neces-
sary to coherent and efficient development of natural resources are often
ignored.
The principal problem created by reliance on PEMEX as a social
1992]
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instrument rather than as an oil company has been the reduction in in-
vestment funds as social objectives are given priority over petroleum op-
erations. This has been a long-term problem. Recent corrective action
has been directed at eliminating subsidies and permitting prices for
PEMEX products to equal those in the world market. Initial steps have
been taken to reduce the bureaucracy within the company. But during
most of the last decade, PEMEX revenues have still been used by the
government to repay international debt incurred by the nation in the late
1970s. As a result, capital investment in PEMEX for 1981 to 1989 fell
almost eighty percent. Even increased investment planned for 1992 will
be only one-fourth the amount absorbed by the company in 1981. To
sustain its production and prevent Mexico from becoming an oil import-
ing country, PEMEX estimates it will need $20 billion through 1995.42
The cost of new reserves is increasing as the company is forced to
drill deeper for replacement reserves. In order to raise the needed capi-
tal, PEMEX must rely on its own profits or incur additional debt. The
constitutional limitations on the company's ability to transfer its conces-
sion interests and to pay compensation with oil production restricts
PEMEX from entering many joint ventures or other forms of develop-
ment contracts that might shift or reduce its financial commitments or
risks. But taxes and social obligations continue to restrict internal funds,
and foreign lenders remain reluctant to become extensively involved in
new debt without substantial government guarantees.
IV. REFORMING MEXICO'S PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
If Mexico is to remain energy independent and take full advantage
of its petroleum resources, significant changes must be made in the way
its oil industry is structured. Several options are available. At one ex-
treme is retention of the present structure but with greater sensitivity to
the problems inherent in government monopolies. At the other is the
complete elimination of the PEMEX monopoly and return of the indus-
try to private enterprize. Neither are particularly viable alternatives.
Effective regulation of authorized monopolies has been an elusive
goal in every country with a system of economic regulation. The diffi-
culty of bringing efficiency to the state oil monopoly is compounded by
42. M.A. Sf.nchez & T. Bardacke, The Private Memoirs of Petroleos Mexicanos, I EL
FINANCIERO INTERNACIONAL, Feb. 2, 1992, at 14, While officials assert that PEMEX can maintain
current production levels of 2.68 million barrels per day for 17 years, some experts claim that Mex-
ico will become a net importer of crude oil by 1998. Id. at 16.
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the lack of economic justification for the monopoly which eliminates any
inherent efficiency gained in such a structure. Moreover, one administra-
tion's pledge to insist on correcting problems associated with monopoly
enterprises through greater government awareness is likely to be short
lived when administrations change and new political issues arise that
tempt a prompt solution by using PEMEX as an instrument of social
policy. Some degree of restructuring will be necessary to ensure that the
inherent problems of the state company are effectively addressed on a
continuing basis.
The dissolution of PEMEX so that most segments of the petroleum
industry can be entrusted to private enterprize could now be accom-
plished without doing severe damage to the political concerns that gave
rise to the company in the first half of the century. No constitutional
amendments would be needed to effect this change. Article 27 of the
Constitution merely places ownership of petroleum reserves in the gov-
ernment and requires government concessions before operations can be
conducted by any party. The position of PEMEX is fixed by regulatory
laws alone that are enacted and changed through the usual legislative
process. Since Mexico's 1938 expropriation, significant advances have
been made in the standard terms of government concessions for private
petroleum operations. Governments have managed to retain much
greater control over the pace and nature of operations, obtained in-
creased shares in the revenues derived from production, and required
more contributions from private companies to the social and economic
development of the host country. These terms can reduce the abuses in
earlier arrangements with private investors and eliminate much of the
exposure to foreign domination that was the root cause of the
expropriation.
But it is still unlikely that such a drastic change will be politically
acceptable. PEMEX is an important national institution. It embodies
the meaning of the 1910 Revolution and stands as a symbol of Mexico's
nationalism. It is the instrument through which the constitutional prin-
ciple of state ownership and development of petroleum resources has
been realized. The government of President Salinas has made significant
strides in reforming the Mexican economy. Decontrol and deregulation
have been pursued with diligence. Even the nation's banks, telephone
system, airline, and communal lands have been privatized. However,
none of these actions entailed challenge to a national symbol and
tradition.
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Even if political issues were put aside, it is not entirely clear that
dissolution of the state oil company would be a wise economic choice.
The usual deterrents to mineral development by any government are a
lack of technology, trained personnel, and funds that can be committed
to the unusually risky business of petroleum exploration and develop-
ment. Mexico's principal problem is the latter factor. In Mexico's case,
the commitment of funds is determined by political priorities and the
assessment of risk. Before terminating the state oil company, the nation
must decide whether a government-owned entity should be engaging in
the risks associated with petroleum operations or whether such risks
should be left to the private sector. In many developing countries, the
risk is clearly too great when other government activities desperately
need funding. But in a country such as Mexico where much is known
about the productive potential of its petroleum reserves and where opera-
tions can be undertaken on a large scale and over a protracted period of
time, risk is reduced. If reduced enough, the government is likely to per-
ceive that it has more to gain by developing the nation's resources on its
own if it can overcome some of the inherent inefficiencies in government-
owned businesses. At the very least, the government is likely to conclude
that the economic gains from restructuring an industry are not worth the
political costs involved.
A. Opening the Industry to Competition
Instead, reform of Mexico's petroleum industry is more likely to be
accomplished incrementally. Initially, this would entail the correction of
some of the inefficiencies inherent in a vertically integrated, government
regulated monopoly. This requires that PEMEX be subjected to compe-
tition from private companies or that it rely on outside companies to
perform some of its assigned responsibilities working under contract bid-
ding. Three factors make it possible for other companies to participate in
this increased involvement in Mexico's petroleum industry. First, many
business activities assigned exclusively to PEMEX can be. opened to pri-
vate enterprize by more liberal interpretation and enforcement of existing
law. Second, PEMEX may contract for services from private companies
on a broader basis, provided the compensation is paid in cash.4" Third,
foreign energy products can be permitted to compete with PEMEX by
recognizing that the company's monopoly over sales of petroleum and
petroleum products extends only to petroleum resources produced in
43. Ley Reglarnentaria del Articulo 27, supra note 10, art. 6.
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Mexico. While PEMEX continues to control many petrochemical opera-
tions, other energy end-users are free to import oil and gas for their own
account without purchasing from PEMEX if arrangements can be made
to transport the product on PEMEX pipelines without discrimination.
Action has already been taken by PEMEX and the government to open
the industry to competition using each of these factors.
1. Petrochemical Operations
Under Mexico's Constitution, a distinction is made between primary
and secondary petrochemicals. Basic petrochemical operations are re-
served to the state as strategic activities and are therefore only produced
by PEMEX. Secondary petrochemicals may be produced by private
companies but only under government concessions.' In 1971, legislation
gave the Executive the right to determine which petrochemicals are pri-
mary or secondary and set the general terms for foreign participation in
private petrochemical operations.45 Under that law, concessions for the
private production of secondary petrochemicals were to be granted after
evaluation of the proposal by the National Petrochemical Commission in
consultation with the Foreign Investment Commission.' The Foreign
Investment Commission is, in turn, constrained by the limitations pre-
scribed in the 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate
Foreign Investment.
In general, foreign ownership of a Mexican enterprise under the lat-
ter legislation must remain less than fifty percent, whether by joint ven-
ture or through direct corporate ownership. In the case of firms engaged
in petrochemical operations, foreign ownership is limited to forty per-
cent.4 7 Under a further restriction, foreign investors, and corporations
owned by foreign investors, are not allowed to acquire direct dominion
over lands or waters or their accessions in a zone that extends one-hun-
dred kilometers along the borders and fifty kilometers from sea coasts.48
Because these zones are prime locations for petrochemical operations,
this restriction is an important one. However, it can be circumvented by
placing the property in a trust held for the benefit of the investor or
44. See Constitution, supra note 9, art. 28; see also 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment
and Regulate Foreign Investment, art. 4, D.O. Mar. 9, 1973.
45. Petrochemical Law, D.O. Feb. 9, 1971.
46. Id. art. 60.
47. 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, supra note
44, art 4.
48. Id. art. 7.
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corporation.49
The Salinas administration has taken several steps to alleviate some
of these restrictions on private enterprise and foreign investment. The
President has exercised the authority granted the Executive in 1971 to
expand the list of secondary petrochemicals open to private manufacture.
Of seventy petrochemical substances reserved for state production in
1986, only twenty remain classified as basic and therefore restricted to
production by PEMEX alone. As a result, 300 companies now produce
about 600 petrochemicals.50
Additionally, regulations issued in 198951 on the implementation of
the 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign In-
vestment provide mechanisms that permit greater percentages of foreign
ownership in secondary petrochemical firms. One device employs a
twenty year trust authorized by the National Commission on Foreign
Investment. Use of the trust requires that the investment improve the
financial or operational condition of an existing Mexican company. A
Mexican bank acting as trustee for a foreign investor may acquire the
entire ownership of the Mexican company. Voting rights are exercised
by a technical committee appointed by the foreign investor with the ex-
ception of one member appointed by the National Commission. At the
end of the trust, however, the company must be resold to Mexican
investors.
Under an alternate approach, corporate stock in the form of neutral
shares ("N" shares) may be issued by Mexican corporations that permit
foreign investors to participate in company profits without holding vot-
ing rights, provided that approval of the arrangement is obtained in ad-
vance from the National Commission on Foreign Investment. These
"N" shares are held in trust by a Mexican bank for the benefit of the
foreign investor and are not counted in determining the amount of for-
eign ownership in the company.
2. Drilling Services
PEMEX is permitted to contract any work or service to conduct its
49. Id. art. 18.
50. See Decree that Reclassifies the Petrochemical Products from the Basic to the Secondary
Petrochemical Industry, i6.O. Aug. 15, 1989.
51. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover ]a Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular ]a Inversi6n Ex-
tranjera, D.O. May 16, 1989.
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operations. 2 Beginning in 1949, PEMEX experimented with co-opera-
tive ventures with foreign companies. Sixteen risk-service contracts were
executed with American independents. In return for assuming the finan-
cial burden and all drilling risks, the foreign driller was entitled to a re-
covery of costs from fifty percent of production revenues and fifteen
percent of such revenues as risk compensation. To comply with Consti-
tutional prohibitions on foreign ownership of reserves, PEMEX super-
vised the work and assumed control of completed wells. However, a
Constitutional amendment in 1958 precluded drilling contracts payable
from production and, during another resurgence of nationalism, the ex-
isting private production contracts were later rescinded. 3
Exploration and development plans for PEMEX are defined and au-
thorized by the Institutional Committee of Investments according to in-
ternal rules that are considered confidential. Drilling plans are also
revealed in the Annual Program of Operations of PEMEX and the insti-
tutional budget and income plans of the organization, which are ap-
proved by the Board of Directors and the Director General who control
distribution of the information. Current practice is to keep the latter
material confidential. These practices add to the difficulty of projecting
the needs, plans, and opportunities to provide services to PEMEX.
However, there are clear indications that PEMEX is interested in
increasing the involvement of foreign drilling and service companies in
Mexico. Two sets of drilling contracts have been executed by PEMEX
with American companies in the last year. These may expand in the
future, particularly in connection with specialized drilling operations.
Credit guarantees of $1.3 billion from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and
$500 million from the Canadian Ex-Im Bank are expected to provide
other opportunities for drilling and servicing contracts to be awarded by
PEMEX to American and Canadian firms. However, the contracts are
likely to remain service contracts payable in cash. Exploration, drilling,
and construction activities by PEMEX are considered public works sub-
ject to Mexico's Law of Public Works.54 This law requires PEMEX to
use a public bid procedure in order to enter into these contracts.
3. Natural Gas Transactions
PEMEX is also slowly being subjected to increased competition
52. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27, supra note 10, arts. 4, 6.
53. Id. art. 6.
54. Ley de Obra Pfiblica, art. 4, D.O. Dec. 30, 1980.
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from foreign energy suppliers. Natural gas producers in the United
States and Canada are particularly anxious to access a greater share of
Mexico's energy market. Declining gas reserves in Mexico, excess pro-
ductive capacity in the other two countries, and the attractiveness of nat-
ural gas as an efficient and environmentally preferable fuel has created a
situation in which Mexico has some advantage in using foreign supplies.
While the market may be limited to northern Mexico where use of pipe-
line systems from across the U.S. border is cheaper than long distance
lines from fields in southern Mexico, the purchase of foreign gas is a step
toward reliance on additional energy sources on the basis of economic
advantage rather than political preference.
There have been obstacles to increased gas imports, however. Coun-
tries traditionally base their gas import policies on considerations of
price, security, and need. For Mexico, these considerations are compli-
cated by several factors associated with energy policy and the nature of
PEMEX. These include:
1. The government's commitment to energy self-sufficiency;
2. Excessively protective concerns over the security and adequacy of
foreign fuels based on avoidance of foreign control;
3. Fiscal and legal restraints on the investment available to the Mexi-
can petroleum sector for construction of additional transmission
facilities;
4. Government subsidies and price controls that interfere with inter-
fuel competition; and
5. Legal restraints on open access to gas transmission facilities and
appropriate charges for service.55
The first two of these factors can serve as the justification for the govern-
ment to reject an import license application by a purchaser. The latter
three can discourage the development of a market for foreign gas supplies
even when there is consumer preference for gas as a source of energy.
Thus, PEMEX itself is in a position to determine whether a sale will
occur by determining whether its pipelines can be used to transport the
gas to many markets.
However, there are signs that Mexico is opening its borders to for-
eign gas. In the period from 1986 to 1988, Mexico imported approxi-
mately 1900 to 2300 Mcf of gas annually. This increased by 724% in
1989 to 16,644 Mcf. After a slight decline in 1990, imports were again
increasing in 1991, with indications that Mexico was interested in
55. For an analysis of these factors, see Gary Conine, Natural Gas Transactions Between the
US. and Mexico: Political and Legal Impediments to Free Trade, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. -1, - (1992).
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purchasing from 100 to 250 MMcf annually. There is hope that direct
sales to end-users will be enhanced with the introduction of new guide-
lines on the pricing of pipeline transmission services by PEMEX.
B. Structuring PEMEX for Competition
If PEMEX is to fulfill its function of developing Mexico's petroleum
resources and maintaining the nation's self-sufficiency in energy supplies,
adequate funding of operations will be essential. The necessary invest-
ment, if it is to come from internally generated funds, will depend on
increased efficiencies within the company or reduced taxes. While the
actions discussed earlier in this article will eventually add some efficiency
to the company's operations, other steps are possible on the part of the
company and the government which can more directly contribute to the
desired results. Some of these have already been taken by PEMEX. Its
operational sub-directories have been re-organized into geographic zones.
The ability of management to compare results among the regions and
attribute responsibility to regional staffs is expected to add significantly
to company productivity. At the same time, the company has made ma-
jor reductions in the size of its labor force. Such measures have been
estimated to be saving the company $1 billion annually.5 6
The government must also play a greater role in this effort. If the
nation's oil industry is to be revitalized, the government must come to
the realization that it is an equity owner of a major industry subject to
business risks and capital demands. The government will have to accept
the fact that successful operation of the industry is hindered by excessive
taxation and by too much responsibility for socio-economic goals that are
more properly the concern of the government itself and the burden of all
sectors of the economy. These obligations must be reduced until the
company's operations are driven by wise business decisions and not by a
socio-political agenda. Much of the responsibility lies with the legisla-
ture. Reducing taxes on the company that are in excess of those imposed
on other business enterprises while shifting social programs to the gov-
ernment budget calls for difficult choices. But the alternative may only
lie in subjecting the economy to even greater difficulty if the nation be-
comes a net energy importer.
56. The company has also attempted to improve its investment opportunities by converting five
of its operating sub-directories into affiliated companies in 1990. Each of these affiliates is involved
in joint ventures with other companies or owns equity interests in other corporations. These rela-
tions permit the PEMEX affiliates to secure outside funding for some of their projects without selling
interests in PEMEX itself to private persons.
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Further action could entail insulating the company from govern-
ment control of operating decisions within the company. The present
Board of Directors is essentially a political Board. To permit the com-
pany to focus on its principal business obligations, the Board ought to be
composed of business, technical, and community experts whose attention
can be devoted to the successful management of the enterprise.
Although the government's ownership of the company assures that there
will always be some degree of government influence, this can be mini-
mized through longer, staggered terms for Board members so that the
Board has some continuity even as government administrations change.
Government control will not and cannot be completely removed
from PEMEX operations. It will be necessary for an effective national
energy policy that must be coordinated throughout Mexico's energy in-
dustry. As direct government involvement in the company's operational
decisions is reduced, it will be necessary to protect public interests in
areas such as the environment and natural resource conservation. Be-
cause PEMEX would retain its monopoly position, abuse of its market
power must still be prevented. Prices would have to be monitored to
protect the consumer. But this must still be done in a way that assured
the company an adequate return on its investment to assure the contin-
ued ability of PEMEX to serve the public. Additionally, it will be neces-
sary to assert some control over private access to PEMEX facilities such
as oil and gas pipelines that are essential to moving petroleum products
to market. Without such controls, foreign suppliers will not be able to
compete against the company and some of the potential efficiency gains
through competition will be lost.
V. CONCLUSION-THE CHANGING STATE OIL COMPANY
The state oil company is an important institution in any developing
country. Its tax base and its effect on economic development give it
political power and subject it to political pressure. To the extent either
becomes excessive and the company focuses on social issues, the less
likely the company will be able to fulfill its assigned task of managing the
nation's petroleum resources. The efficiency problems in a bureaucratic
monopoly are problem enough in a capital intensive industry without the
constant drain of revenues toward projects related to or dictated by polit-
ical issues. What could be a source of strength for the economic develop-
ment of the country becomes a disappointment when neither the socio-
economic goals nor the business goals of the enterprise can be achieved.
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Presently, these weaknesses are being manifested in a lack of inter-
nally generated funds that can be dedicated to continued exploration and
development. In order to overcome the immediate problem and still
maintain the existence and authority of the state owned company, funds
must be found through greater efficiency in operations and through a
reduction on the socio-economic demands of the enterprise. Internal re-
organizations are a beginning. But much more is promised through
changes that subject the company to competition in areas that can be
removed from full state ownership and control. Even more can be
achieved by reducing government reliance on the revenues of the com-
pany and removing some of the obligations it has for social programs and
policies.
These adjustments greatly change the complexion of the state enter-
prise, but they still honor and even promote the original purposes behind
the creation of the company. It is true that these changes will result in
less direct control and coordination by the government in energy mat-
ters. However, without change, these companies will continue to have
difficulty replacing depleting reserves, overproduce existing reservoirs,
and ultimately fail to provide the energy products or revenues needed to
drive a developing economy. Some moderation in the responsibilities of
these companies is needed to achieve a satisfactory status for the local
industry. At the very least, the government must begin to view the com-
pany as a true enterprise rather than as a state agent and to be more
mindful of the fact that its election to manage its petroleum industry
through a state owned entity has deficiencies that detract from its central
purpose. The focus then must be on assuring that the company serves
the public interest as a business and not as another bureaucracy.
The volume of Mexico's oil production, the size and success of
PEMEX, and the country's courage in assuming control of its petroleum
industry before the ownership of state oil companies had become popular
have given Mexico a leadership role among petroleum producing coun-
tries despite its refusal to join OPEC. This places Mexico in a position to
set the trend in coming years as producing countries attempt to over-
come the investment problems encountered by state oil companies in
times of lower crude oil prices. The direction Mexico selects for PEMEX
in the next few years may well affect not only the Mexican economy but
the international structure of the oil industry as well.
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